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PART 1 INTRODUCTION 
In this research paper the writer is faced 1~ith the task of scrutinizing the 
bearing of public international law, as the topic suggests, on contracts or 
agreements entered into between private foreign corporations and states. 
Such contracts are usually called State Contracts. It should be noted that 
the writer is concerned with State Contracts that are not governed by the 
domestic law of a particular State or States. In this regard the writer 
will begin the research paper by briefly describing the parties involved in 
State Contracts and the nature of such agreements. The writer will then 
look at the circumstances where it may be deemed to be a breach of inter-
national law arising out of a breach of a State Contract. This section of 
the research paper is the crux of the whole research paper and the bearing 
of public international on State Contracts will be discussed in detail 
there. The third section of the research paper will be devoted to the 
discussion of the World Bank Convention, 1965. This Convention is interesting 
in that it expressly stipulates that public international law may be chosen 
by the parties to be the law governing a particular contract. · Finally in 
discv.s 
the Conclusion, the writer will briefly the growing tr~nd towards 
adopting an international commerical law or usually called international 
la~" of contract whi eh 1~i 11 apply _to State Contracts of the type concerned 
in this research paper. The writer will then end the paper by discussing 
that the changing structure of international law makes it inevitable that 
public international law should also govern contractual relations between 
a State ~nd a private corporation as opposed to the traditional notion that 
public international law only applies to state/state relations. 
- lA -
A. PARTIES 
State is the typical and most obvious example of an international person. 
The typical of a traditional definition of \vhat is a State is the often 
quoted provision of the Montevideo Convention of 1933 which stipulates 
that a S ta te : 
11 as a person of i nterna ti ona l l av, should possess the fo 11 ov,i ng 
qualifications 
(a) a permanent population; 
(b) defined territory; 
(c) a government; . and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations v1ith 
other States 11 • 1 
Another definition is that 
"a State, for the general purposes of international la\•1, · is 
a territorial unit, containing a stable population, under 
the authority of its ovm government, and recognised as being 
capable of entering into relations with other entities 11 •
2 
bv ando_gy 
Both definitions
1
/have one thing in common for our purpose, that is, a State 
is an international legal person capable of entering into relations with 
<,r w, the'-+ 
other entities with,<international personality. ~Jhy then do States enter 
into agreements with private corporations not being inter~ational persona-
lities? Private corporations are known as legal persons once registered 
under a system of registrv.tion in a municipal legal system and once having 
that corporate legal entity they are capable of entering into transactions 
as \vould an ordinary individua l do, that is, a corporation or company is an 
artificial person with perpetual succession, thus, may own property, make 
contracts and sue and be sued. 
"' 
~ . 
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Over the years, nationals 3 of one State have entered into business transactions 
not only with their counterparts in another State, but also with the foreign 
State itself. These contracts are usually called "international contracts" 
although this term is not a perfect description of such transactions.
4 McNair 
tends to prefer the expression "Economic Development Agreements 11 ,
5 but it 
would seem that such a description is too specific and a bit one sided. It is 
also suggested that such contracts be called "transnational agreements 11 ,
6 how-
ever because of the confusion the name of such transaction might make, for our 
purpose such transactions wi 11 be referred to as II s-h, te contracts 11 • 
These contracts have increased in numbers in recent years with the intensifi-
cation of international trade and with the emergence of new States, particularly 
the 3rd \,Jorld countries, desirous of developing rapidly their economy and 
industry through the promotion of their external· trade and the encouragement 
of foreign investors and technical asiistance. In this way untapped natural 
resources can be utilized, thus, contributing immediately to the welfare of 
the State. 
It should be noted that the status of the parties to such 11 !--t-C\·te. con-
tracts'' is unequal in law, in fact or both in law and fact because of the fact 
that the foreign party is a private corporation whereas the second party is 
either an international legal person or often a government owned agency. Further, 
the relationship between States or other international persons is subject to 
public international law, while relations between a private person and a foreign 
State is governed by some municipal legal system (which is determined by the 
rules of conflict of laws) except in so far as universally recognized principles 
of customary international law have been incorporated into such municipal rules 
so as to become an ingredient thereof. Because of the confusion as to which law 
is applicable to the latter relationship, discussion or that subject will be 
made in the next chapter. 
B. NATURE OF AGREEMENT 
l. State Contract 
Firstly, I take "State Contracts" for our purpose to mean Contracts between 
States (and in some cases State Corporations a~d other public bodies) on the 
one hand and a foreign private individual, firm or corporation on the other. 
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The typical factual background is as follows 
A State has entered into a contract with a private person the 
national of another State. Under the contract the foreign 
party to the contract may undertake, for example, to build 
a railway or to supply goods or make a loan, whether on security 
of bonds or otherwise or may be granted a concession. 7 In other 
words, I exclude intergovernmental agreements as vJe 11 as agree-
ments between governments and public international institutions. 
II. International Contract 
In simple terms, it is submitted that once a contract has moved to the inter-
nationa l plane, it cannot lawfully be affected by unilateral, national legal 
action . Since States cannot invoke their sovereignity to abrogate an inter-
nationa l treaty by analogy, it is argued, neither can they do so to alter an 
internationa lized contract. 
It is difficult to precisely define what is an ''international contract",
8 but 
an attempt to define it is worthwhile. Basically, the factors on 9 which the 
overall definition of international contract should be based are 
i. nationality of the parties; 10 
ii. the character of the negotiations; 
iii. the subject matter of the contract. 
Firstly, contracts between parties whether corporate or individual must be of 
different ·and clearly identifiable nationalities and that their principle place 
of business and bulk of their activity must be carried out in their respective 
countr ies. When it comes to a contract between a parent company and foreign 
subsidiaries or agents it must be established that they are effectively in-
dependent in handling their own operations without depending on their parent 
company. Provided such factor is proved, the contract entered may not be 
classified as an "international contract". 
Secondly, although the character of the negotiations would seem to bear little 
weight on the definition of "international contracts" it is essential 
11 because 
it shows that parties who enter such contracts are very experienced and sophist-
icated businessmen who are assisted by legal and other experts. 
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Further, that armslength ne~otiations result in freely agreed agreements which 
are far from ordinary contracts. Negotiations also reveal the complexities 
of such contracts. However, usually the courts are satisfied by the fact that 
the parties are from different countries and operate within the context of 
legal systems different from the other party's or that the contract involves 
a commerc ial transaction that relates to international trade and business 
operations. 1
2 It is submitted that such approach should be favoured because 
the needs of international commerce are not necessarily commensurate 1vith the 
size of the transaction, its complexity, the use of experts or the degree of 
sophisticat ion of the parties.
13 
Thirdly, in regard to the subject-matter test, legal and economic considerations 
seem to play a complementary role. "On the l egal side the contract must have 
contact with several countries, expose the parties to the vagaries of Conflicts 
Law, enable them to forum shop and 'jockey' in order to secure 'tactical 
litigat ion advantages'. On the economic side, the factors to be taken into 
account are the particular transnational nature of the services rendered on 
the aggressive economic penetration of new fields of activities by one of 
the partners 11 • 1~ State practice of two major industrialized countries, namely 
France the United States of America support the above view.
15 ·The French view 
is that a contract would be considered as 'in ternational 
I if it affects the 
interests of international trade.
15 In contrast, the United States view is 
that the contract must show that : 
i. the parties are of different nationalities with their principla 
place of business and the bulk of their activity in their respective 
countries; 
ii. 
i i i . 
negotiations took place in several countries; 
ll 
the subject-matter of the contract concerns international trade. 
Thus, the writer is of the opinion that "it is the multifarious contracts of the 
transact ion with several legal systems which gives it its 'international 
1 
status . 111 '3 
III. Internationalization of Contract 
Once the possibility of some kind of internationalization of contracts between 
a government and a foreign corporation is establ-ish ed the question that is 
asked is : What are the conditions under which it can be said that contract 
is internati onalized? 19 
"' 
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The Texaco/Calasiatic Case
20 suggests three possibilities any of which is said 
to suffice. The contract may refer to "general principles of law" as the 
applicab le law, it may provide for an arbitration clause, or it may be an 
"economic development agreement 11 • It should be noted that the Texaco/Calasia-
tic Case did not list the simplest and most obvious possibility that of express 
refere nce to public international law.
21 The omission might have been because 
it is probably rare to refer to public international as the governing law of 
the agreement. However it has been suggested that contracts between States 
and aliens can be governed by i nterna t i ona l law, if such ·is expressly chosen 
by the parties as the proper law of the contract.
22 
if i7 Q00. ·, ~' ,-er~c.k{ --H, w.+ 
Thus , . once an agreement has moved to the international level, it cannot law-
1/' "'V\ U\'1, lo:re r,d 23 
full y be affected byAnational legal action. It is argued that since States 
canno t invoke their sovereignity to abrogate an internat ional treaty, neither 
can they do so to alter an internationalized contract. 
a) Clause identifying that international law governs the contract 
It is possible for parties to contract where one of them is a State that their 
legal relationship will be governed by public internationa l law.
24 This is 
only a choice-of-law clause, adopted for convenience or other purposes.
25 It 
has been suggested that 
11 It is possible, howe ver, for contracts betv;een parties only one of 
whom is an international person to be subj ec t to public international 
law. (a) According to the theory referred to, a contract could be 
internationalized 11 in the sense that it would be subject to public 
international la\'J strict.a sensu~ that, therefore, its existence an d 
fate would be immune from any encroachment by a system of municipal 
1 a1.; in exactly some manner as in the case of treaty between t1.;o 
international person; but that, on th e other hand, it would be caught 
by such rules ofjus cogens as are embodied in public international 
law. 1126 
Thus , where the parties have consented that the proper law of the contract is 
public interna tional law, it follows that either party has a right to invoke 
pub lic international law to settle any disputes arising out of the contract. 
Any breach of such contract either by the State party or by the foreign 
corporation would amount to a breach of internat ional law. 
~ . 
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It would then follow that the whole of the contractual relations has its 
existence in public international law and that the foreign corporation is 
assumingly given international personality by a mere choice of law. This 
seems to be a move away from the law regarding state responsibility since a 
breach of the contract is automatically a breach of international law vis-a-vis 
the foreign corporation personally and not vis-a-vis the State of the corpora-
tion by maltreating its nationals. It would also mean that where the foreign 
corporation breaks such contract, the State party may sue the foreign corpora-
tion at international law which is contrary to the present position of inter-
national law. The difficulty presented by the reciprocal nature of such 
contract may be solved if it is conceded that the foreign corporation acquires 
international personality either for these purposes or in general, but it is 
extremely doubted that this is possible in the present state of international 
law. 
An alternative view is that despite the fact that a contract between a State 
or a foreign corporation may refer to public international law as the law 
governing the contract, such contract should not be raised up to the inter-
national plane as such, but that the contract should remain at the municipal 
level whereby principles of international law would be invoked to interprete 
and give effect to the contract.
27 This approach seems to have been taken by 
Lord Asquith in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration
28 whereby it is submitted that the 
sole arbitrator was correct in applying or extracting applicable criteria 
from general principles, while not committed to the view that the contract 
had its existence in the international legal system a? such. 
It is submitted that the present position of international law and the State 
of authorities do not allow such internationalization, therefore a mere choice 
of law cannot c-0nvert a breach of such a contract by a State party into a 
breach of international law vis-a-vis the aliens State.
29 
C~, \ C. 'J"1C+ I C. 
The arbitration in the Texacq~Case agreed that the reference to 
11 general 
principles of law" means a reference to "international law" as it 1-;as said 
that "general principles of law" are one of those elements, for example, 
international custom, state practice, which form the general principles of 
international law. 30 
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It was further said that international arbitration confirms that reference 
to the 11 genera l principles of la~<J'' is ah1ays regarded to be sufficient 
criterion for the internationalization of a contract.
31 However it should 
be noted that the exact meaning of 
11 general principles of law 11 has not as 
yet been solved despite the efforts of many jurists to characterize what 
they are and it does not necessarily mean that such reference is made to 
internationa l law
32 Lord Asquith in the Abu Dhabi Arbitration clearly refrained 
from the above trap by saying that 
11 The terms of that clause invite indeed prescribe, the application 
of principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the 
generality of civilized nations - a sort'of 
11 modern lav, of nature 11 ••• 
But albeit English Municipal law is inapplicabl e as such, some of 
its rules are in my view so finely grounded in reason, as to form 
part of this broad body of jurisprudence - this 
11 modern law of 
nature. 1133 
It is not clear whether what he meant by 
11 modern nature of lav/'1 are those 
known as general principles of law as embodied in the Statute of· the 
Internationa l Court of Justice as a source of international law or was it 
11 genera l principles 11 of a different nature. 
b) Arbitration Clause 
It is said that the presence of an arbitration clause in a state contract 
suffices to bring the contract to the international level. In the Texaco/ 
Calasiat i~ Case33
 it was stated that 
11 Another process for the internationalization of a contract consists 
in inserting a clause providing that possible differences which may 
arise in respect of the interpretation and the performance shall be 
submitted to arbitration 11 •
34 
Submission to arbitration could be a factor to be considered when deciding 
whether the parties intended to internationalize their contractual relation-
ship, but in reality it would seem that the paramount purpose of an arbitra-
tion clause is to remove any dispute that may arise out of the agreement from 
the jurisdiction of the domestic courts of both parties to a neutral forum.
35 
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It is with this reason that I submit that the presence of an arbitration clause 
can hardly be construed as necessarily a sign of internationalization and also 
as a factor for determining the applicable law question. It is said that the 
arbitrat ion clause has two-fold consequences. On the one hand, the institu-
tion of arbitration shall be established by international law and on the 
other hand, the inclusion of an arbitration clause leads to a reference to 
the rules of international law.
36 This conclusion was reached on the ground 
that , firstly, the mere fact that the sole arbitrator was appointed by the 
Pres ident of the ICJ. on the request of one of the parties it implied that 
interna tional law applied and governed the arbitration. 
Secondly, the arbitration adopted the reasons ~voked by the arbitral tribunal 
which decided the Aramco Case
37 which stated that 
11 It follows that the arbitration, as such, can only be governed by 
international law, since the Parties have clearly expressed their 
intention that it should not be governed by the law of Saudi Arabia, 
and since there is no ground for the application of the American Law 
of the other party. This is not only because the seat of the Tribunal 
is not in the United States, but also because of the principle of 
complete equality of the parties in the proceedings before the 
arbitrators .... 38 
I disagree with the view of the sole arbitrator in the Texaco/Calasiatic Case 
tha t 'even if one considers that the choice of interna tional arbitration pro-
ceed ings cannot by itself lead to the exclusive application of international 
law , it is one of the elements which makes it possible to detect a certain 
interna tionalization of the contract'.
39 His conclusion, that the reference 
to an international arbitration is sufficient to internationali ze a contract 
was based on the award of the arbitration in the Sapphire Case
40 which held 
that 
11 If no positive implication can be made from the arbitral clause, 
it is possible to find there negative intention , namely to reject 
the exclusive application of Iranian Law 11 •
41 
Theor itically, it could be argued that the Sole Arbitrator's view i s quite 
correct only on the issue of determining the intention of the parties to inter-
nationa lize their contractual relation ship,but on the practical side it would 
appear that the parties only intend to refer any dispute arising out of the 
contrac t to a neutral forum. 
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c. CONCESSION AGREEMENTS 
The Texaco/Calasiatic case lists "economic development agreements" 
(Concession agreements) as a possible manner in which a contract can be 
internationalized.
42 These are different kinds of State Contracts from the 
43 44 
normal contracts between States and private persons. The elements that 
characterize these agreements are that 
i. their subject matter is particularly broad: different form the 
normal State Contracts, they tend to bring to countries parti-
cularly to under-developed 3rd World countries investments and 
technological assistance, especially in the areas of research and 
exploitation of mineral resources or general helping towards 
building the infrastructure of the countries. It is because 
of their participation in the developing of the country that 
they become very important. · 
ii. The long duration of these contracts infers that close co-opera-
tion between the State and the contracting party is essential and 
such contracts involve payment installations as well as the in-
vestor acquiring a greater amount of responsibilities. 
iii. In addition to element II and the magnitude of the investment the 
private contracting party has agreed to perform, the nature of 
such contract is reinforced, that is, "the emphasis on the con-
tractual nature of the legal relation between the host State and 
the investor is intended to bring about an equilibrium between 
the goal of the general interest sought by such relation and the 
profitability which is necessary for the pursuit of the task en-
trusted to the private enterprise 11 •
45 
Because of the enermous risks involved in such large investments the investor 
must be given protection particularly from the effects of legislative enact-
ments and State acts which would amount to the violation of the agreement in 
one way or the other. A classic example would be the incorporating of the 
so-called Stabilization clause that has the effect of removing the whole or 
part of the contract from the domestic law of the host State to another system 
of law ' su i generis' or as argued in the Texaco/Calasiatic eo.~~ to the public 
international law system.
46 
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Support for the view that concession agreements perse are internationalized 
contrac ts is had by reference to the Sapphire Award which held that 
"Such a solution seems particularly suitable for giving the 
guarantees of protection which are indispensable for foreign 
companies, since these companies und ergo very considerable risks 
in bringing financial aid and technical aid to countries in the 
process of development. It is in the interest of both parties 
to such agreements that any dispute between them should be 
settled according to the general principles universally recognised 
and should not be subject to the particulpr rules of national 
l 
1147 aws ..... 
It has been argued by jurists that concession agreements are of such a complex 
and different nature as distinct from other State Contracts that the relations 
of States and foreign investors as such should be treated on the international 
. leve l and not as an aspect of the normal rules governing the positio11 of aliens 
and their assets on the territory of a state.
48 
In principle private corporations which have their existence in a municipal 
law system do not have international legal personality and as such a conces-
sion agreement between a State and a foreign private corporation is not 
49 . 
governed by the law of treaties. 
The arbitral tribunal in the Texaco/Cal asiat ic c~se in its attempt to clarify 
and specify the meaning and the exact scope of intern at iona1ization of a 
cont ract came to th e conclusion that legal international capacity is not 
attr ibutable to a State and that international Law encompasses subjects of 
dives ified nature. 
This is a shift away from the purely 11 inter-sta te 11 international law, in 
response to contemporary developme nts, cons eq uential demand and incidental 
cla ims. Conservative international la1vyers would undoubtedly deny a place 
in international law of private corporations in view of the present position 
in international law. 
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Th e arbitral tribunal's conc.lusion is not without support in that it i.s 
said that 
"But if we regard international law as a system that has, from its 
very beginning, responded to the social ne eds of international life, 
and that must con t inue to respond to the changing structure of 
international relations, its li mitation to the forms of yester-year 
- . 50 
is not only injurious but quite unn ecessary". 
The arbitral tribunal stated that if States enjoy all the capacities by the 
inte rnational legal order then, other subjects would enjoy, not all capa-
cit i es enjoyed by the State, but only limited capacities, that are assigned 
to specific purposes. 51 Thus, it was stated that a private person acquired 
only limited capacities for the purposes of interpretation and performance 
of t he contract and could invoke in the field of international law the rights 
he derived from the internationalized contract . 52 
- 12 -
PART 2 BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. STATE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE TREAT~ENT OF ALIENS 
I. Circumstances of "breach of Contract" 
The contracting State may act in breach of contract, legislate in such a 
way to the effect that the.contract becomes worthless,use its powers under 
the municip~I law to annul or repudiate the contract. What,then is the 
position in terms of international law. In principle, the position is 
regulated by the general principles governing the treatment of aliens. The 
general view53
 seems to be that a mere breach 6f contract does not in itself 
create state responsibility in international law. Wrongful interference by 
a State with the rights of an alien may occur i~ a number of ways, but the 
separation of cases into those arising out of breaches of contractual obli-
gations as opposed to those relating to tortious acts is essential in view 
of the different principles of international law involved. More particularly 
we are concerned in this paper only with the role of international law where 
there is a breach of State contracts. Thus, it would be beneficial to attempt 
to look at and consider the factors v~hich 11ould amount to a violation of 
international law simultaneously with a breach of State Contract. 
a) The Absence of Remedies/Penial of Justice 
Under the conditions and in what circumstances can the conduct of the third 
branch of Government, namely, the judiciary, involve the international 
respons ibility of the State? In cases of responsibility of this type, the 
problem that one faces is the question, what does the term "denial of justice" 
mean? 54 In the first place, the term 
11 denial of justice" is often interpreted 
broadly as encompassing all the acts/omissions which ~re capable of amounting 
to international responsibility on the part of the State for injuries caused 
to an alien, independently of the organ which may have been the direct cause 
of such injury. 
Hm,ever, I 1<1ould submit that the term "denial of justice" should be construed 
narrowly to include only acts or omissions of those judicial authorities, or 
some organ or officials directly connected 1<1ith the administration of justice. 
Nevertheless this argument has not received unanimous support as yet and even 
internationa l case-law on this point is somewhat conflicting.
55 
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It is with this argument that I form the opinion that the effect of the 
lack of remedies afforded to the alien amounts to a "denial of justice". 
Wha t then are the conditions in which it can be said that there is an 
'absence of remedies'? 
The conditions which will be explained below are, denial of access to the 
courts of the State,
56 absence of ;ndependent courts,
57 illegally consti-
tuted courts.
58 
The International Fisheries Co. case is a good case that exemplifies this 
( 
poin t. It was said that because the claimants had the right to appeal to 
the Mexican courts for justice, as the government of Mexico cctn, as a 
genera l rule, be sued in its own Federal Tribunals .. '.
59 , that right of 
appea l to the Mexican Courts sufficed to prevent the breach of contract by 
administrative declaration ill egal under international law. The inference 
that can be drawn from the above case is that if the State cannot be sued 
in its own courts of Law, then that amounts to a breach of an internationa l 
obligation . 
Where an alien is prevented from enforcing his contractual rights by legal 
process in the domestic courts of the State party, that denial of free access 
to the courts of the State party gives rise to an absence of remedies situ-
ation .60 It was said in the Amba tielos Case (Greece v UK.) that : 
"The modern concept of 'free access to the Courts' represents 
a reaction against the practice of obstructing and hindering 
the appearance of foreigners in Court, a practice which existed 
in former times and in certain countries, and which constituted 
an unjust discrimination against foreigners. Hence the essence 
of 'free access' is adherent to an effectiveness of the principle 
of non-discrimination against foreigners who are in need of 
seeking justice before the courts of the land for the protection 
and defence of their rights.
61 
The court further said that free access to the Courts meant that the foreigne
r 
shall enjoy full freedom to appear before the Courts of the State party for 
the protection or defence of his rights whether as plaintiff or defendant and 
in the v1ords of the Court "to use the Courts fully and to avail himself of 
any procedural remedies or guarantees provided by the law of the land in 
order that justice may be administered on a footing of equality with 
62 
nationa ls of the country". 
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Although the principle of 11 free access to Courts 11 in this case was based on 
'discrimination' between foreigners and nationals it is submitted that in 
effect~twuld have the same application in the situation where aliens were 
denied access to Courts of the State party to enforce their rights under 
State contracts where there was allegation by the alien of a breach of 
Contract by the State. 
Where the alien has access to Courts of the State party, but the Courts 
established to entertain the aliens grievances is not independent then the 
absence of such independency amounts to a denial of justice or an absence of 
remedies. 63 Thus, the acts of the courts are not considered insufficient 
unless the 11rong committed amounts to an outrage, bad faith, wilful neglect 
of duty, or insufficiency of action apparent io any unbiased man. 64 The 
case of Robert E. Brown (U.S.A. v Great Britain )6
5 exemplifies the 
situation that there is a denial of justice or absence of remedies where 
Courts are legally constituted under the domestic law of the host State, but 
the Court lacks the independency to make a just and unbiased judgement. The 
tribunal , although disallowing U.S.A. claims on behalf of her citizen on the 
grounds that Great Britain did not succeed to Acts of the South African 
Repub lic, agreed that there was a denial of justice or absence of remedies. 
The tribunal held that .... 11 we are persuaded that on the whole case, giving 
proper weight to the cumulative strength of the numerous steps taken by the 
Government of South African Republic with the obvious intent to defeat Brown's 
claims, a definite denial of justice took place. We cannot overlcok the broad 
facts in the history of this controversy. All three branches of the govern-
ment conspired to ruin his enterprise. The executive department issued 
proc lamations for which no warrant could be found in the Constitution and 
Laws of the country. The Volksroad enacted legislation which, on its face, 
does violence to fundamental principles of justice recognised in every en-
lightened community. The judiciary, at first recalcitrant, was at length 
~educed to submission and brought into line with a determined policy of 
the executive to reach the desired result regardless of Constitutional 
guarantees and i nhabiti ons 11 • 66 
Similarly, where a Court has been established and adjudication has occurred, 
Con.,ti·hi1 ''<.\ 1 
but the Court has been illegally/ then the effect of such illegality is 
that there has neve r been any adjudication, thus, an absence of remedies 
Sl·t t" . 67 ua 10n an ses. 
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b) Legislative Interference 
\~hen the State resorts to its lavJ making powers to modify or annul the rights 
and obligations of itself and the foreign corporation, it is submitted that 
suc h an act creates an issue of an international character.
68 In the first 
instance its act is the use of its Sovereign and Legislative power and not 
69 
as a party to a Contract. Secondly, the State in using its legislative 
powers in changing existing rights and obligat~ons arising from a Contract 
to which it is a party.
70 Thirdly, it is taking away the contractual and 
obligations, including the right of litigation.
71 Finally, "when an alien 
enters into a Contact with a State, he is engaging in a business transaction. 
It is reasonable to expect that an ordinary businessman will acquaint himself 
with the existing laws of the State with which he contracts concerning the 
transaction into which he is entering. He equally freely consents to the 
app lication of the existing laws to that transactions
11
•
72 Thus, foreign 
corporation in the ordinary course of business expects that its contractual 
rights and obligations should be respected and complied with and that such 
exist ing contractual rights and obligations should not be removed or altered 
by legislative process. 
(: 
The distinction between a mere breach of contract and a State legi slating to 
alter or annul the contractual obligations may be best explained by comparing 
the cases of Serbian Loans
73 and ertain Norneg ian Loans.
74 The Serbian 
Loans Case is a dispute between France and Serbia in which the PCIJ was 
asked to consider the interpretation of a gold clause in a loan agreement 
wh ere certain French bondholders, advanced money to the Serbian Government. 
France argued that the clause established a gold value for payments of 
interest protecting the bondholders from the effect of currency depreciation. 
If the argument postulated by France is correct then the actions of the 
Serbian Government amounted to a breach of Contract. The dispute rose to 
the international plane only because those who were in dispute were two 
internat ional persons. The mere fact that the Serbian Government's actions 
breached the contracts with the French bondholde~did not raise the question 
of international law. However, the question of international law would be 
raised only under the law of State responsibility where there was allegations 
of a denial of justice. 
Thus, it was not the dispute between the Serbian Government and the French 
bo ndholders that charac terized the dispute as an international one that 
come into the jurisJiction of PCIJ. but the difference of opinions of the 
two Governments. 
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The;Norwegi an Loans Case concerns a dispute betv,een Norway and French bond-
holders which were taken up by France Governments and the dispute was primarily 
centred on the effect of Norwegian legislation which the bondholders argued · 
that the effects of such legislation was to absolve the Norwegian Government 
from complying with the loan agreement. The ICJ. did not decide the case on 
its mer its as it had upheld an objection submitted by Norway on the grounds 
of lack of jurisdiction, but individual judges did say something on the 
"internat ionalization 11 of the contract. 
Judge Reed's dissenting view on the Norwegian contention that the subject 
matter of the dispute was within the domain of the municipal law of Morway 
and not of international law was that 
11 when the French bondholder bought 
a Norwegia n bond, there were only two parties to the executory contact which 
came into being - the bondholder and the Norwegian borrower, either the State 
or one of the b10 Banks. The Government of France had no part in the trans-
action . It was made under national )aw ...... At this stage the transaction 
come solely within the plane of national law. It would therefore be a matter 
in which the Court was incompetent to adjudicate, and in which it would be 
necessary if dealing with the Merits to say that there v1ere no rules of 
internat ional law governing the transaction'
1
•
75 Judge Reed was of the 
opinion that 11 someth ing more is needed than the mere adoption of c1 dispute 
under the national l aw to give rise to a question of international law 
within the meaning of the expression used in Article 36, paragraph 2, 
Clause (b). There must have been a breach by Norway of an obligation under 
internationa l law due to France
11
•
76 The passage of legislation by the 
Norweg ian Government which consequently gave Norwegian Government the power 
to suspend payment in gold to the French bondholders, raised the question, 
whether Norway could in con1formity with the principles of international law, 
by legislative action unilaterally modify the substance of the contracts 
between Norwegian borrowers and French bondholders? 
Judge Reed in upholding the French Final Submissions was of the opinion that 
'in these circumstances, there can be no doubt that questions of international 
la1~ are involved and that the court is competent to deal with the claim sub-
mitted to it' . 77 
It is therefore submitted that the dispute was raised to the international 
plane by the same action that France alleged the Norwegian Government to have 
had caused a breach of contractual, namely, the enactment of legislation to 
modify contractual ri ghts and obligations. 
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It therefore follows that once the dispute was raised to the international 
plane, such breach of contractual obligations amounted to breach of inter-
national law, however it should be noted that international proceedings 
co uld not be instituted unless local remedies were exhausted. 
If 
Judge Lauterpacht was of the opinion that the relevance of these questions 
of international law raised by Norway cannot properly be denied by reference 
to the fact that unless and until Norwegian courts have spoken it is not 
certain that there has been a violation of international la\v by Norway. The 
crucial point is that assuming that Norwegian law operates in a manner 
injurious to French bondholders, there are various questions of international 
law involved. To introduce in this context the question of exhaustion of 
local remedies cannot in itself bring within the province of international 
law a dispute which is otherwise outside its sp~ere. The failure to exhaust 
legal remedies may constitute a bar to the jurisdiction of the court; it 
does not affect the intrinsically international character of a dispute'
1
•
78 
I submit that even if the international character of a dispute is established 
the local remedies must be exhausted before such dispute can be ·tieard by an 
international forum. 
There is also another view79
 that . a Government in legislating to modify or 
annul contractual rights and obligations is analogous to confiscation and 
such contractual rights and obligations are e~uipdrated as property. The 
breach of such rights and obligations would amount to confiscation.
80 In 
the ShufeldtClaim the arbitrator had to consider the responsibility of . 
Guatamala for a decree made by the Legislative Assembly that declared null 
and void~b initio a contract, the benefit of which was assigned to Shufeldt 
an American citizen. Under the contract Shufeldt was entitled to extract 
circle from a piece of area on a public land but only for a certain period. 
The importance of this case is that both parties to the Contract agreed that 
if the contract was valid it created rights of property. Although the decree 
of the Legislative Assembly put an end to the contract, such decree could 
not deprive Shufeldt of his right to compensation for the loss of his property 
rights. Further, the decree of the Legislative Assembly which destroyed the 
property rights, for practical purposes amounted to an act of confiscation 
anJs·uch action, it is submitted,vJas pri ma facie a breach of international 
law. 
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A distri ncti o~ should be drawn between the ShufeldtClaim and the Se
rbian 
C.:rtc,,.., . 
Loans and;Non,egian Loans Cases because in the ShufeldtClaim intern
ational 
law looks at the alleged wrong from the point of view of the tortiou
s act 
against property rather than from the contractual stand point wherea
s in 
the latter two cases the vie1-v taken is that a passage of legislation
 which 
has the effect of modifying or annulling contractual rights and obli
gations 
is at the same instance a breach of contract ~nd a breach of interna
tional 
law once the contract is raised to the international plane.
81 
c) Breach of Treaty Obligations 
It is quite clear that a breach of international la1-v occurs v1hen a p
arty to 
a treaty commits an act prohibited by such treaty. It is submitted 
that, 
based on the same principle, where a treaty postulates that a partic
ular 
contract between one of the states party to th~ treaty and nationals
 of the 
other states party shall be performed or that the rights created und
er the 
contract shall be recognized, a breach of such contract will amount 
to a 
breach of an international obligation to the other states party.
82 It also 
follows that where a treaty specifically prohibits acts which might 
interfere with contractual rights of nationals in foreign states the
 States 
being parties to such treaty, then a breach of contract by that Stat
e will 
amount to a breach of international law.
83 
The Martini Case is the best example that supports the above view. 
In that 
case the Venezue la Government entered into a Concession agreement w
ith 
Martini & Co. an Italian Corporation whereby the Italian Company was to 
contruct and operate a railroad as well as to operate a coal ,nine .
84 Thi3 
contract was terminated by a decree of the Federal Court of Cassatio
n of 
Caracass on the 4/12/1905. The Italian Company in its c9unter clain1
 argued 
that the Venezuelan Government had breached the concession agreement
 by 
granting to one Antonio Feo the monopoly of shipping oxen from the p
orts of 
Guanta and Puerto Cabello to the Island of Cuba. This argument was 
rejected 
by the tribunal on the ground that Martini & Co. did not invoke the trec1ty 
before the Court of Cassation at Caracass
85 and that the Feo Contract in 
no way constituted a violation of Martini's concession contract. 
Artic le 5 of the Feo Contract reads : 
"The National Government engages, on its part, not to allo1-1 the esta
b-
lishment of any other steamship line for the transport of cattle from
 
the Venezuelan ports herein specified to any of the ports of the Re-
public of Cuba". 86 
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Article 9 of the Treaty of Con1nerce between Italy and Venezuela of June 19, 
1861 reads 
"The two high contracting parties engage not to grant, in their 
respective states, any monopoly, exemption, or privilege, to the 
detriment of the commerce, the flag or the citizens of the other 
State. The provisions of the present article do not extend to 
the privileges for the articles of which the commerce belongs to 
the two nations respectively, to patents of invention of improve-
ment and of introduction, which remain entirely governed by the 
particular laws and regulations in force in the two countries. 
The Coast wise trade will be governed in the two states, by the 
particular laws in force 11 •
87 
The Ita lian government contended that the monopoly granted to Feo constituted 
a violation of the 1861 treaty by which the contracting parties agreed not to 
grant any monopoly to the prejudice of the citizens of the other state apart 
from certain exemptions in the treaty. The tribunal rejected this contention 
on the grounds that : 
i. The tribunal was only concerned with matters in the comp romis and not 
whether the Feo concession had breached the 1861 treaty namely whether 
the decision of the Court of Ca ssat ion constituted a violation of the 
above treaty. 
ii. The decision of the Court of Cass ation would have rendered the Government 
I I. 
·of Venezuela responsible for the violation of the 186 1 treaty only if 
Italy, relying upon the treaty, had made a complaint against the Feo 
contract before the Government of Venezuela (assuming that Italy's inter-
pretation of the prohibition of monopolies was correct ) and the Court 
in the action against Martini & Co. had declared that the Feo contract 
was in confirmity with the treaty. But such was not the case. 
Breach of Contract per se not a breach of intern ationa l law 
There is a school of thought ~hich supports the view that a mere breach of a 
contract between a State and an alien by the State party will amount to a 
breach of international lav1~8 
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Sup porters of this view base their arguments inter 
acquired rights
89 and the principles of 'pacta sunt 
t hese arguments refer to decisions of international 
alia on the doctrine of 
90 servanda and to support 
arbitration but these 
cases are usually not on the point because the tribunals were not applying 
i nte rnational law or that the cases were decided upon some other elements 
and not on the breach of contract question~ Carlston ,for example, argues 
tha t 
11 \~hen, however, the termination is effected by the exercise of 
sovereign power instead of claimed contractual right, there is 
very considerable authority for the proposition that international 
responsibility to the state of the concessionaire directly and immedia-
tely arises 11 • 91 
He points 011t that termination of a contract by the exercise of claimed contra-
ctual right should not by itself entail internat"ional responsibility vJhich is 
qui te clear and need no further discu~sion,
92 however a unilateral termination 
by t he state not in the exercise of contractual right will amount to state 
'b'l 't 93 res pons1 1 1 y. 
Sta te practice in relation to this 
94 C<!.ri-n,..., 
Los inger & Co. Case and~Norwegian 
vi e1<1 is very weak. For example in both the 
Loans Case95 Switzerland and France res-
bound by obli ga tion s to an pec tively argued to the effect that a State is 
al i en at the ti me when the contract is made.
96 No other stat e seems to have 
adop ted th e Swiss/France doctrine , however, in the Anglo Irani an Oil Co. Case, 
Br itaih also argued .on the same lin es as did Switzerland and France in the 
above cases in that it was argued in its memorial that acquired rights must 
be respecified by the State granting the concessions.
97 
The practice of the two leading wes t ern countries, USA . and UK. is that they 
req uire so me other elements apart from the me re breach of contract before they 
can comme nce internati onal proc eeding s for allega tions of breach of international 
law . Thus, they do not support the view that a mere breach of state contract 
by a state will amount to a breach of international law. 
Intern ational decisions show that th ere is little su pport for the view that a 
brea ch of contract by a State of a State Contract i s per se a breach of inter-
nat ional l aw. 
by a State of 
inte rn ati ona l 
In contrast, th ere is solid eyidence t ha t breach of contract 
a State Contract is regarded not to be a violation per se of 
l 
100 aw. 
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 . 
A well nown case ar 1n1 1s a goo examp e a suppor s ea ave view, 
but it should be noted that the tribunal's decision in that case v1as to a degree 
affected by the limited power granted to the tribunal by the compromis. Hence 
the tribunal was asked not whether the Feo Contract granted by the government 
was repugnant to the 1861 treaty but whether in the action brought against 
Mart ini & Co. there was a denial of justice or manifest injustice or a viola-
tion of the 1861 treaty. The tribunal thereby concluded that in the action 
agains t the Italian Firm there was no violation of the 1861 treaty. Although 
the tribunals competence was limited to the contents of ihe compromis, it seems 
that it did not take the view that the breach of contract alleged by the . 
Italian firm as a result of Venezuela granting a monopoly to Feo amounted to 
violation of international law nor did it consider applying principles of 
international law to decide whether the allegation that Feo contract amounted 
to a breach of Contract also amounted to a violation of internat ional law. The 
tr ibunal was of the view that the decision of the Court of Cassation would be 
respected if such court applied the Venezuela Law restrictively without ill 
wi ll to foreigners. It held that : 
"If the Court of Caraccas in adopting a restrictive interpre tation 
of the Martini Contract on the basis of Venez uela · Law, rea ched the 
conclusion that the Feo monopoly was not contrary to the Martini 
Concession that conclusion cannot be characterized as erroneou's 
or unjust by an internat ion ~l tribunal
11
•
103 
However the tribunal also held that according to the rules of responsibility 
of states, Vene4uela was responsible for the decision of the Court of Caracas 
ho lding the Italian Company liable in man ifest violation of the Ralston 
arb itral award and that the deficiencies of the decision of the Court of 
Cassat ion amounted to manifest injustice within the intent ion of the compromis 
thus amounted to a violation of the international obligations of the State. 
Thus this case shows that a breach of contract perse is not a violation of 
internat ional lav1 but some other elements
104 must be established, for example 
denia l of justice, exhaustion of loca l remedies rules, before diplomat ic 
intervention by the State of the alien is resorted to for allegations or 
breach of contract. Even if the tribunal would have thought that the Feo 
contrac t was in breach of the Martini concession the tribunal seems to have 
had the view that the municipal law (in this ca se Venezuelan) was adequate, 
to hand le that matter. 
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Further if the tribunal were asked to decide whether the Feo contract breached 
the 1861 treaty it would have entertained the case on the international plane, 
not as an argument between a private person and an international person, but 
between two international persons for allegations of breach of treaty by the 
other states party, although Italy would then be asked to prove whether the 
Feo contract breached the Martini contract as a pre-requisite. 
. l F. h . . C C l 05 OY\A • t · The Internat,ona 1s eries o. ase concerns,< merican corpora ,on, 
Internationa l Fisheries Company 1 which claimed that it suffered damages as 
a result of the cancellation by the Mexican Government of a contract or con-
cession which it granted to a Mexican company en the ground of non-perform-
ance of the terms of the contract, wherein the claimant possessed a consider-
able number of shares. The said contract contained a Calvo clause. 
The tribunal held that because the claimant could appeal against the cancella-
tion of the contract or concession of the Mexican Corporation in the Mexican 
courts such cancellation did not amount to an arbitrctry act which could be 
see as amounting to a breach of international law. Thus, again it is sub-
mitted,supporting the view,that a breach of state contract is not perse a 
violation of international law until such act in the words of the tribunal 
becomes an "arbitrary act'' . 106
 
Another schoo l of thought which it is submitted to be the better view and in 
conformity with the present state of law is that, as already seen in the 
arguments regarding the other school of thought therefore needs no further 
discussion, a breach of contract by a State party contract, whether it be 
an ordinary state contract or a concession agreement is not perse a violation 
of international law until some other elements are established.
107 This 
argument should be isolated from another argument that. a breach of contract 
is a tortious act, therefore the breach itself amounts to a breach of inter-
national law. 108 These other elements would include a denial of justice 
11 , II l 09 
stnctos-e11.7v and/or lack of remedies situation. 
It is therefore on the above grounds that I come to the conclusion that : 
II a breach of contract becomes a breach of international law not 
Qerse but when other conditions are also ·present. States become 
liable for violations of international law arising out of breaches 
of contract under the law of state responsibility for the treatment 
of aliens. 
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It is submitted that international law specifies what requirements 
should be present in order to enable a state to discharge its 
duty of treating an alien according to international standards 
in relation to contractual right s, and responsibility is incurred 
when these requirements are not met. Thus, ordinarily, it is not 
as a breach of contract qua breach of contract that contractual 
claims will be actionable at international law but as a delict 
committed in the treatment of aliens 11 •
110 
III. Breach of International Law under the }aw of State responsibility 
a) Conditions under which such law is applicab l e 
The Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions Case
111 which was decided by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice exemp lifi es the way in which breach 
of contract (in this case they were concession contracts) would give rise 
t . b . 1 . t ll 
2 Th M t . h h d to sta e respons1 1 1 y. - e case concerns one avrornma 1 s 1v o a 
entered into co~cession contracts, under which, inter alia, he was to construct 
an electric tramway, supply of electric lights and po1,,1er and of .drinking 1vater 
in Jerusalem. It was alleged by the Governmen t of Greek Republic that the 
Government of Palestine, then under the Mandate of Great Britain refused to 
recognize to their full extent the rights acquired by Mavrom:Hatis, a Greek 
under contracts and agreements concluded by Ma vro ITTTia ti s vJi th the Ottoman 
Authorities in regard to the above mentioned concessions. Under various 
treat ies and by the terms of the Mandate itself Great Britain was obliged to 
respect certain Concessions granted by the Ottoman Authorities. Another con-
cession was granted to one M. Rutenberg which it was alleged to breach the 
Mavrommat is Concessions.Clause 29 of the Rutenberg Concession infact provided 
that if any former concessions infringed the rights in the Rutenberg Conces-
sion, Rutenberg was given the right to ask -t-he new government to annul 
Mavrommatis' rights and pay compensation, but Rutenberg never exercised this 
right and he in fact renounced the exercise of this right. Great Britain 
also during the course of proceedings undertook not to annul the concessions 
granted to Mavrommatis. 
In the first phase of the case with regard to the question of the jurisdiction 
of the (PCIJ) court to entertain the claim, the Court held that although the 
dispute was at the beginning between a private perso~ and a state , the dispute 
was pushed up to the i11ternational plane when the Government of Greek took up 
the case thereby mak ing it a dispute between two international persons. It was 
then and there that internationa l law principles became applicable. 
LAW l1BRARf 
f!f:TOPIA IJH!VERSITY OF Wfl 11··', r .," 
-c:t 
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The Permanent Court of International Justice held that :-
"Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects 
before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the 
State is the sole claimant~
113 
The court also said in that judgement that it was an elementary principle of 
internat ional law that a State was entitled to protect its nationals if 
they became injured by acts repugnant to principles of iriternational law 
done by States and legal redress was not made or such redress was obtained 
but was of improper standard. 114 
Why then did the Greek Government take up Mavrommatis' Case?. Firstly, it 
was certainly not the mere breach of Mavrommati~ Concessions which occassioned 
them more,but that the way in which the Gritish Government was handling Mavr-
ommat is1 concerns \vas such that it is submitted to hav e amounted to a denial 
of justice situation. 
The question of the nationality of Mavrommatis was discu sse d in the early 
stages of the Merits Case.The British Governme nt contended that the concessions 
granted to Mavrommatis 1-,ere invalid because Mavrnmmat is v1as referred to in the 
concess ion as an Ottoman subject whereas his real nationality was Greek. 
Br itish Government thereby, submitted that the concess ions v1ere granted in 
error ,therefore were invalid. It should be noted that while Mavrommatis' 
Greek nationality w~s questioned in the ear ly stages of the Merits Case,~,e 
Br itish Government,during the course of the proceedings, did agree that 
Mavromma tis v,as a Greek subject. 115 The court said that the validity of the 
conces sions was assume d throughout all negotiations and that Ottoma n nationa-
lity was not a pre-condition to granting a concession contract. lhat the 
iden tity of the person was never in doubt and that the intentions of the 
part ies were also clear. 116 
In the words of the PCIJ. it held that : 
" .... the reference of M. Mavrnmmatis as an Ottoman subject in the 
agreemen t s concerning the Jeru sa l em Concessions, is not intende d to 
repres ent a condition on which the grant of the concession is depend-
ant and that, therefore, the fact that M. Mavrommatis is not an 
Ottoman subject cannot involv e the invalidity of the concess ion. 
The concessions mus t therefore be regarded as valid and definitely 
.acquired" . 117 
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This shows that the injured person must be a national of the Claimant State 
at the time of the happening of the injury and must continue to be a national 
until the case is disposed off. 
The Court also decided that the existence for a certain period of a right on 
Rutenberg to request that the rights of Mavrommatis under the latters conce-
ssions be annulled was a violation of international obligations of the 
Mandatory of Palestine. This holding of the Court re-inforces the view that 
a mere breach of contract, does not amount to a breach of international law, 
but that the breach will amount to a breach of international obligations 
of (in this case) Mandatory of Palestine (UK) \vhere the respondent state 
is obliged to conform with its internationa l obligations. Hence, a dispute 
would only arise as a result of the breach of contract between two State 
parties and not between a private person. This ~ispute would only be concerned 
with a breach of international law and not on the breach of Contract. 
IV. 118 Calvo Clause Effect of : 
The doctrine, it is submitted, is founded on two factors namely : that Sovereign 
States being free and independent should have the right to contract with alien~ 
on a basis of equality free from any interference of whatever nature by other 
States especially the State of which the alien is a national; that aliens are 
not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals thus they should 
resort to local authorities to claim redress for allegations of any breach of 
t t 1 bl . t. 119 con rac ua o 1ga·1ons. 
What then is the effect of the Calvo Clause? 
In other words, can an agreement between an alien and a State which contains 
the Calvo Clause deprive the state of alien's nationality the right to take up 
its subject's case for allegations of breach of international l aw under the law 
of State responsibility? What is the validity of the Calvo Clause in interna-
tional l a\·J? 
It is usually said that the Calvo Clause is invalid on the grounds that an in-
dividua l, be it a natural or legal person, cannot 'renounce the protection of 
his state and waive rights accruing to the State under internationa l law' . 120 
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on the other hand it is said that the Calvo Clause is valid so far as it is 
limited only to its limited sphere, namely that the alien agrees that any 
claims arising out of the contract must be made to the local authorities 
without calling on its State of nationality to make these claims and that 
the applicable law is the law agreed to by the parties which is usually the 
121 
law of the contracting State. In the North American Dredging Co. Case 
it was held that : 
11 
••• it is evident that its purpose was to bind the claimant to be 
governed by the laws of Mexico and to use the remedies existing 
under such laws ..... In other words, in executing the contract, in . 
fulfilling the contract, or in putting forth any claim regarding 
the interests or business connected with this contract the claimant 
should be governed by those remedies which Mexico had provided for 
the protection of its own citizens. But this provision did not, 
and could not, deprive the claimant of his American citizenship 
and all that implies . It did not take from him this undoubted 
right to apply to his own Government for protection if his resort 
to the Mexican tribunals or other Authorities available to . him 
resulted in a denial of justice or delay of just ice as that term 
is used in international lavJ. In such a case the comp laint's 
complaint would be not that his contract was violated, but that 
he had been denied justice. The basis of his appeal would be not 
a construction of his contract, save perchance in an incidental way , 
but rather an . internationally illegal act
11
•
122 
It should therefore be noted in so far as the Calvo Clause emphasises the duty 
of an alien to submit to the law of the contracting State in whose territory 
he happens to be or the necessity of exhausting local remedies before a claim 
may arise under international law under the law of state responsibility, the 
Calvo Clause merely repeats the existing principle of international l aw that local 
reme dies must be exhausted before a request can be made to the State of nation-
al ity to take up the matter on the international level. Thus the conclusion 
drawn from the above discussion is that an alien cannot renounce the protect-
ion of his State and waive rights accruing to the State under international 
law.123 
- 27 -
B. STATE SUCCESSION 
I. Acquired rights must be respected by the successor State 
There is a view that, unless the successor State renews the concession 
contracts, obligations arising under such contracts are terminated and not 
binding on the successor State \!Jhen there is a change of sovereignity. Thus, 
the successor state is not bound to honour obligations that arise from such 
contracts which were binding on the predecessor State. 124 However, I submit, 
that the proper view is that rights acquired under concession contracts must 
12 5 . 
be respected by the successor State. The duty to respect rights arising 
out of concession agreements has been recognized in cases of State succes-
sion.126 D.P.O'Connell states in his exhaustive study that : 
"The generally consistent practice \!Jhich has just been analysed 
is clearly based on the principle that th~ acquired rights of a 
concessionaire must be respected by a successor State••. 127 
The same author also states that : 
"The change of sovereignity may affect a contract in one of two 
ways, depending upon whether the contracting sovereign survives 
it or not. If it does not survive, the contract lapses with one 
of the co-contractors. If it does survive, the contract only 
lapses if as a result of the change, it is frustrated. ln either 
event, whether the contract fails for want of party or because of 
frustration, the successor State is not subrogated in its rights 
and duties. Therefore, it is not called upon for contractual 
performance. However that is not the end of the matter. Municipal 
law rarely leaves the loss where it falls in cases of frustration 
of contract or want of a party. It has equitable devices for re-
storing a balance between the parties, such as quantum meriut or 
unjust enrichment. Theyform part of the "general principles of 
law" available to international tribunals for solving problems of 
like juridical significance. When a private contractor has part-
ially performed the contract before it lapsed he has an equitable 
interest to the extent of the performance. This constitutes an 
"acquired right" which is unaffected by the change of sovereignity. 
The formal contractual relationship may have expired but the equity 
has not". 128 
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This means that although the. successor State may not be a party to contractual 
agreements entered into by the predecessor State, nevertheless, the former 
is tota 1 ly subroga ted in the contractual relationships of the latter, that 
is, the successor State has to respect the acquired 
. ht 129 Thus, v1here r, g s. 
an alien's property is involved, a diplomatic claim may be made by the State 
to which the alien is a national, against the successor State if the latter 
does not respect the acquired rights. This claim is only available under the 
S . b. l . t l 
30 f l h l . t . law of tate respons1 1 1 y, or examp e, w en an a 1ens proper y 1s 
nationalized without appropriate compensation~ etc. Hence, where a claim is 
made against the successor State i n this respect and the particular forum has 
jurisdiction, it may order the successor State, just as it would order another 
State , to effect rest i tution. 
131 
II. Lighthouses Arbitration 
The Lighthouse Arbitration concerns a dispute arising out of a concession 
agreement entered into between a French firm, Callas & Michel and the Govern-
ment of Crete in 1860 in+h~ matter of certain lighthouses which the former, 
was required under the concessions, to manage and maintain. Several claims 
and counter claims we re made by the French firm as vie 11 as the ·Government 
of Greece respectively, but we are only concerned with Claim number 4. In 
1908 the Government of Crete by vi rtue of a certain statute exempted a Greek 
ship Aghios Nicolaos from payment of the normal lighthouse dues. This was 
allege d to be a breach of concession agreement by the French firm. It should 
be noted that this tase of the Lighthouse Administration was later taken up 
by France. In April 1913, the Balkan war broke out in which, inter alia, 
Greece and Turkey 1-1ere involved. The \·Jar terminated by the Treaty of Athens 
of November 1913 as a result of which certain territories, including the 
autonomous State of Crete, were ceded to Greece. The arbitral tribunal 
was faced with the problem of deciding the responsibility of Greece as successor 
State of the State of Crete. Further, the validity of the concessions in dispute 
were never in dispute . 
The only objection raised by Greece \•Jas that the claim made against her "pass(ed) 
all the bounds of logic' 1 , 132because it was argued that it i mp lied a demand that 
Greece should "assume the debts of the former Ottoman Empire on the ground that, 
f
. 13~ 
1ve years after the voyage of the vessel to Crete, that island became Greek" . .., 
-
'" 
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The tribunal however held that Greece was the successor State and as such 
the dues and concessional charges of Crete succeeded to her. She was there-· 
fore responsible for the breach of the concession contract involved in 
exempting the ship 11 ~hios Nicolaos" from paying light dues to Collas & 
Michel . 
The tribunal stated that : 
11 
••• it can only com·e to the conclusion that Greece, having adopted 
the illegal conduct of Crete in its recent past as autonomous State, 
is bound, as successor State, to take upon its charge the financial 
consequencies of the breach of the concession contract, otherwise the 
avowed violati on of a contract committed by one of the two States, 
linked by a common past and a common destiny, with the assent of the 
other, would, in the event of their merger~ have the thoroughly 
unjust consequence of cancelling a definite financial responsibility 
and of sacrificing the undoubted rights of a private firm holding 
a concession to a so-called general principle of non-transmission of 
debts in cases of territorial succession, which in reality does not 
exist as a general and absolute principle. In this case the Greek 
Government with good reason commenced by recognizing its own resp-
. b · 1 • t 11 134 ons1 1 1 y . 
In arriving at its conclusion, the tribunal was also influenced by the fact 
that the Greek Government had in the past, before acquiring full sovereignity 
over Crete, had knowledge of the illegal nature of ex~mption and even after 
the acquisition of full sovereignity over Crete she had continued with that 
illegal arrangement. Thus, this case reaffirms the principle that acquired 
rights arising from concession or other State contracts must be respected, 
notwi ths tan ding the fact that there has been a change .in soverei gni ty. 
c. THE PRINCIPLE OF 1 PACTA SUNT SERVANDA 1 
I. Extent of Applicability 
There is a view that where State contracts have been internationalized, inter-
135 
nationa l law will govern that agreement . To substantiate their view re-
ference is usually ha to the application of the 1vell known principle "pacta 
sunt servanda 11 • 
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How far can this principle be applied in State Contracts or the so-called 
internationalized contracts? The majority of juristic writers seem to 
favour the proposition that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is a fund-
. . l f 1 f d . 11 t . 136 P f \ I hb . h . amental pr1nc1p e o aw oun 1n a na ions. ro essor ,e erg 1n 1s 
authoritative study states 
11 \iJe have described the rule of pacta sunt servanda as a general 
principle of law that is found in all nations. It follows, 
therefore, that the principle is valid exactly in the same 
manner, whether it is in respect of contracts between states 
or in respect of contracts betv1een state·s or in respect of 
contracts between states and private companies. Whether, one 
regards ... the contract of a state with a foreign company for 
the purpose of granting a concession as be)ng quasi-international 
law agreements, or whether one ascribes to them another character, 
the principle of the sanctity of contracts must always be applied . 
. ... the principle of sanctity of contrc-.d.s is an essential condition 
on the life of any social community. The life of the international 
community is based not only in relations beh1een States, but also, 
to an ever-increasing degree, on relations between States and 
foreign corporations or foreign individuals. No economic relations 
between States and foreign corporations can exist without the 
principle pacta sunt servanda. This has never been disputed in 
137 · 
practi ce 11 • 
State practice also shows how the principle of pacta sunt servanda has been 
· 138 
invoked to protect aliens. Thus, any unilateral modification or termina-
by the State contractor is regarded as an act tion of a state contract 
violative of the principle pacta sunt servanda, and contrary to international 
law. In the Losinger Case13
9 and Certain Norwegian Loans Case!
40 both 
Switzerland and France respectively argued to the effect that the principle 
pacta sunt servanda not only applies to agreements between States, but also 
to those concluded between States and nationals of other States . Therefore 
a breach of such contracts was a breach of the principle pacta sunt servanda, 
which then amounted to a violation of international law. However, this 
argume nt by Switzerland and France has gained little or no support at a11
141 
because it assumes that a mere breach of State Contract amounts to a breach of 
international la1'/ \'lhich is not in conformity 1·1ith the present State of inter-
national law. 142 
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It is with the above reasons that it is submitted that although the principle 
pacta sunt servanda underlies all contractual relationships either it be 
State-State relationship or State-Alien relationship, nevertheless it cannot 
be correct to postulate that a termination, etc. of a State Contract per se 
is a breach of international law. 
I I. Is a State Contract a mere Contract or a Treaty? 
In order to answer this question, the writer is of the op1n1on that the best 
starting point would be to refer to the Vienna Convention on the La1v of 
Treaties (hereinafter the Convention)
143 and examine the relevant provisions 
contained therein. Article 2 (1) of the Convention, inter alia, reads 
(a) 11 treaty 11 means an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed b-y i nterna t ion al )~~~ther 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
. t t d h t . t t . l d · t · 11144 ins rumens an w a ever 1 spar 1cu ar es1gna 10n ... 
Article 2 (a) of the Convention is self explanatory in that it states that the 
basic requirement is that there must be an international agreement between 
States . There is no qualification added to the word "States". Thus, it 
is submitted that an international agreeme nt that is not made between States 
cannot be described as a treaty.
145 This was exactly what the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain attempted to do in the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case~
46 The 
United Kingdom of Great Britain argued that due to the role she played in the 
negotiation of a concession agreement between the Government of Iran and the 
Anglo Iranian Oil Company that concession agreement had a double character, 
the character of being at once a concessionary agree1i1ent betvJeen the Iranian 
Government and the Company and a treaty between the two Governments.
147 
The contention of the United Kingdom was framed as follows 
11 
••• when there has been an international dispute between two 
Governments which is settled on certain terms, there arises under 
internationa l law an obligation binding the two Governments to 
observe the terms of settlement and this obligation arises, even 
though the settlement takes the form of a concessionary contract 
between a State and a private company .... 11 • 
148 
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The International Court of Justice rejected this argument. The Court stated . 
"The Court cannot accept the vi evJ that the Contract signed between 
the Iranian Government and Anglo(Iranian) Company has a double 
character . It is nothing more than a Concessionary Contract 
between a government and a foreign corporation. The United 
Kingdom Government is not a party to the contract; there is no 
pri vity of con tract betv1een the Government of I ran and the 
Government of the United Kingdom. Under the Contract the Iranian 
Government cannot cl aim from the United Kingdom Government any 
rights which it may claim from the Company, nor can it be called 
• 
upon to perform towards the United Kingdom any obligations which 
it is bound to perform towards the Company. The document bearing 
the signatures of the representatives of the Iranian Government 
and the Company has a single purpose : the·purpose of regulating 
the relations bet\>-1een that Government and the Company in regard 
to the Concession . It does not regulate in any way the relations 
149 betl-Jeen the· tv10 Governments". 
IV' Further~reference to the situation which gave rise to the United Kingdom 
Government rais i ng the above argument the Court stated 
"The juridical situation is ~ot altered by the fact that the 
concess ionary contracted was negotiated and entered into through 
the good offices of the Council of the League of nations, acting 
through its Ra.pporteur. The United Kingdom, in submitting its 
disp~te wi th the Iranian Government to the League Council, was 
only exercising its right of diplomatic protection in favour of 
one of i ts nationals. It was seeking redress for what it believed 
to be \vrong which Iran had committed against a juristic person of 
British nationality. The final report by the Rapporteur to the 
Council on the successful conclusion of a new concessionary contract 
between the Iranian Government and the Company gave satisfaction 
to the United Kingdom Government. The efforts of the United Kingdom 
Government to give diplomatic protection to a British national had 
thus borne fruit, and the matter came to an end with its removal 
from the agenda". lSO 
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Had the Court accepted the British argument on the double character of the 
concession agreement it would have consequently and undoubtedly held that 
the failure by the Iranian Government to honour the Concession agreement 
amounted to a breach of international law under the principle of pacta sunt 
l 51 
servanda . 
A reference is also made to the Island of Palmas Case
152 to add weight to the 
above discussion that a private corporation does not possess treaty-making 
capacity. In the Island of Palmas Case the arbitral tribunal said : 
''As regards contracts between a State .......... and native princes 
or chiefs of peoples not recognized as members of the community of 
nations, they are not, in the international law sense, treaties or 
Conventions capable of creating rights and obligations such as may, 
' ' t' l l ' f t t , . II 1 53 1n 1nterna ,ona aw, arise out o rea ,es . 
It is therefore in my opinion that in accordance 1vi th the authorities referred 
above especially with regard to the holding of the International Court of 
Justice in the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case
154 and by analogy to the fact that 
an individual does not have treaty-making capacity,
155 State Contracts 
entered into between States and private corporations are merely contracts 
and cannot be treated as treaties. To hold that State Contracts are treaties, 
there fore, the rules governing treaties are thereby applicable, would only 
mean the following : 
i) that a private corporation would be assumed as having 
156 
treaty-making capacity as States do. 
ii) that it would be assumed that a breach of a State Contract 
per se would be a breach of international law .
157 
HO\ve ver the present state of international la1·J is clearly contrary lo the 
above assumptions. 
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PART 3. THE CONVENTIOI ON THE SETTLEMENT 
A. 
OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES 
AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES (1965) 
THE PLACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nat ionals of other States (hereinafter I.C.S.I.D.) 158 establishes a perma-
nent Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter the 
Centre ), 159 and offers services of conciliation and arbitration of investment 
disputes. 160 The jurisdiction of the Centre is dealt with in Chapter II of 
161 the I.C.S.I.D. Consent of the parties is the cornerstone of the jurisdic-
tion of the Centre and such consent must be in writing and once given cannot 
be withdrawn unilaterally. 162 It has been said that consent must be expressed, 
exp licit, unequivocal and not open to doubt. 163 However, consent alone will 
not suffice to bring a dispute within the Centre's juri sd iction. There are 
further requirements provided in Article 25 (l) of the I.C.S.I.D. namely 
that the dispute must be a "legal dispute arising directly out of an invest-
ment11 164 and such dispute must be between a Contracting State165 (or a const-
ituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State) and a national of 
another Contracting State. 166 Article 25 (l) reads : 
'
1The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment , between a Contracting State 
(or any Constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in 
writing to the Centre. When the parties have given their consent 
no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally". 
It is therefore submitted that the jurisdiction of the Centre is limited to 
States and nationals of States which are parties to the I.C.S.I.D. Thus, 
non-Cont racting States as well as nationals of non-Contracting States 
cannot be parties to di sputejbefore the Centre. 167 
1. 
a) 
Reference to International Law 
Choice of Lav./ 
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. 
According to the I.C.S.I.D. the parties have full freedom to select, by 
I l f l t b l . d . th l t f d · t 
168 
agreement t,e rues o aw o e app 1e 1n e sett emen o 1spu es . 
Artic le 42 (l) of the I.C.S.I.D. reads 
11 Th e T r i b u n a l s ha 11 de c i d e a d i s p u te i n a cc o r d a n c e 1v it h s u c h 
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence 
of such agreement, the Tri bunal shall app ly the Law of the · 
Contract ing State party to the dispute (including its rules on 
the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as 
may be applicable". 
The litera l interpretation of Ar t i cle 42 (l) of the I.C.S.I.D. wou l d seem to 
be, it is submitted, that rules of international l aw
169 would be applicable 
by virtue of the 11 choi ce of l av.J' ' provision in an agreement or v1here no such 
prov1s 1on is ava ilabl e, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 
42 (l). 170 The question whether international law shou ld directly be applied 
as the governing law of State-Contracts or contracts of the type under the 
I.C.S. I.D. has been a subject of controversy among internationa l l awyers,
171 
however the I.C.S.I.D. has clearly stated in the affirmative that international 
law can be applied by virtue of the "Choice of Law" provision.
172 However, 
internat ional law may be selected as the appl i cable law 'p rovided that full 
force and effect is .given to all the terms and conditions of the investment 
agreement and to the intent of the parties as expressed therein' .
17 3 What 
then is the meaning of the term "rules of law" as contained in Article 42 (l) 
of the I.C.S.I.D.? First ly, by stipulating "rules of . law" as opposed to 
"system of l a1v" the I.C.S.I.D. apparent ly intends to allov, the parties as 
much arbitral flexibility as they care to choose .
174 However, the absence 
of a definition of "rul es of law" given by the I.C.S.I.D. l eaves the confu-
. "d 175 11 l 11 s1on w1 e open. It has been said that rues of law refers to spec i fic 
legal systems such as the law of a particular state , even the law of the 
host State, internationa l l aw or perhaps one formulated entirely ad hoc.
176 
It may be argued that in using the 'Choice of La1v' 1 provision the investor may 
be reluctant to agree to the application of the host States law as it is 
assumed that the investor would not submit its investment to a system of 
la1·11vhich 1•1ould be unstable, having in mind the fact that the host State's 
legislative powers may be exercised in future that would affect its in terests .
177 
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There is another view that investment agreements between States and private 
investors of the nature stipulated by the I.C.S.I.D . are quasi-public 
international contracts that are governed by the "lex contractus" agreed to 
by the parties. 178 Supporters of this view argue that neither a particular 
\CW,/ 
national legal system nor public international).can govern such agreements 
because the investor is not a subject of international law, but the law that 
governs such agreements is the one formulated by the parties to the contract.
179 
Another possibility is the reference to general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations. 180 The main objection to this type of legal system, 
as it were, is that public international law is not capable of dealing with 
181 the complexities of an investment agreement. Further, it is argued that 
public international law i s designated to govern relations between States 
and other subjects of i nternationa l law and not relations with private 
investors .182 The major i ty of juristic writers on this subject so far have 
adopted the vie1v that the term "rules of la1v" refers to a definite legal 
183 system . 
It is therefore submitted that the term "rules of la1./' should mean that 'the 
parties should submit the investment to a definite, legal syste~ or combina-
tion of particular l egal systems. However, in the event that the system 
chosen by the parties as the applicable law governing the investment is 
inadequate and therefore produces a juridical void, the automatic provisions 
of Article 42 (1) will app ly ' . 184 
b) Automatic choice of l aw 
The I .C.S.I. D. specif i ca ll y provides in Article 42 (1) that if the parties 
fail to agree on the "rul es of l aw" to govern particular investment agree-
ment "the tr i buna l sha ll apply the l aw of the Contracting S.tate party to the 
dispute (inc l uding its r ul es on t he conflict of l aws) and such rules of 
international law as may be app l icable''. As already stated the question 
whether rules or princip l es of international law can be directly applied 
to a dispute between a State and a non-State party is cl early answered by 
the I.C .S. I . D . • Even state practice shows that arbitrators have had recourse 
to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, but usually 
their reasons for app lying the general principles vary . 185 
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Thys, the writer is of the opinion that in a way the I.C.S.I.D. restates 
and reaffirms state practice that general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations can be invoked where the law applicable to a particular 
contract is inadequate or the parties have intended such result . 
What then is the meaning of the term "and such rules of international lav-1 
as may be applicable" as contained in the second sentence of Article 42 (1) 
of the I.C.S.I.D. The separate mention of international lav, from "the law 
of the Contracting State'' suffices to mean that the two legal systems should 
be app lied. This is supported by the Report of the Executive Directors of 
the World Bank186 which reads as follows 
"Under the Convention an Arbitral Tribun al is required to apply 
the law agreed by the parties. Failing such agreement, the 
Tribunal must apply the law of the State party to the dispute 
(unless that l aw calls for the application of some other l aw), 
as well as such rules of internat ion al law as may be applicable . 
The term "international l a1'1'' as used in this context should be 
understood i n the sense given to it by Article 38 (1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, allowance being 
made for the fact that Article 38 was designed to apply to 
. t St t d. t 187 ,n -er- a e 1spu es. 
Apart from the above Report of the Executive Directors there is no further 
elaboration as to what are appropriate rules of international law that will 
be applied . However, going back to the Report of the ~xecut ive Directors 
it is quite clear that the term ''and such rules of international l aw as 
may be applicable" was meant as 'the rules of international lavv relevant 
to the case and that international law is the l aw whose sources are indicated 
in Article 38 of the Statute of [Internati ona l] Court of Justice with the 
well understood reservation of necessary adaptations since that Statute only 
refers to inter-State disputes . 188 
Thus, it would mean , it is submitted, that international l aw as applied in 
accordance with Article 42 (1) of the I .C.S.I.D. would be applied where 
there is a conflict between the two legal systems or where there is a 
lacuna in the Contracting States law in cluding its rules on Conflict laws.
189 
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Then comes the question whether the Contracting States law is superior over 
international law or vise-versa? Literal interpretation of the second 
sentence of Article 42 (l) of the I.C.S.I.D. would be construed as meaning 
that the two legal systems would be applied simultaneously. One writer
190 
who supports this construction states : 
"The text in its present formulation v1ould indicate if taken 
literally, simultaneous application of the two laws, but the 
reference to the law of the State should counsel prudence to 
arbitrators and guide them to call on the more general rules 
of international l aw only where the State law is well adapted 
to settlement of the dispute or in case of flagrant violation 
of the law of nations". 
h "t 191 t th b . b t . h ,·t . , . htl Anot er wr1 er suppor s ea ove view, u approac es 1n as 19 y 
different way. He states that 
"The Tribunal will first look at the lav1 of the host State and 
that law will in the first place be applied to the Merits of 
the dispute. Then the result will be tested against international 
law. That process will not involve the confirmation or denial 
of the validity of the host State's law, but may result in not 
applying it where that law, or action taken under that law 
violates internationa l law. In that sense, as I suggested 
earlier, international l a1v is hierarchically su!Jerior to 
national law under Article 42 (1) 11 • 
Both writers in one way or another agree that international law is superior 
over the law of the Contracting State. 
In t t t th f · . th "t 
192 b" . h" t con ras o e orego1ng views ano er wr, er, as1ng 1s argumen on 
the traditional notion that a sovereign State cannot be subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the laws of foreign States other than its own,is of the 
opinion that an investment agreement to which a sovereign State is a party 
with a foreign national and which is the subject matter of a dispute cannot 
-the. 
be submitted toJjurisdiction of the laws of foreign States other than those 
of the host States'. Thus, the view that the law of the Contracting State is 
superior over international law. 
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However, the writer is of the op1n1on that such is not the right interpret-
ation of Article 42 (l) of the I.C.S.I.D. It is submitted on the contrary 
that the hierarchical order would be that international law is superior 
over the law of the Contracting State party on the grounds that 
I. it is argued that the spirit and letter of Artic le 42 (l) 
calls for the parties to a dispute before the Centre to be 
treated on an equa l footing without one having the upperhan~ 
in this situation,presumably the Contracting State party. This 
argument is supported for example by the fact that under 
Article 42 (l) the parties are free to choose any particular 
legal system(s) as they may agree to govern their investment 
agreement. Hence, the formulation of the second sentence of 
Article 42 (l) is designed to maintain or enhance that equality 
between the parties. 
II. the standard in which the law of the Contracting State party 
should be applied is the (minimum) standard set by international 
law. Thus, the law of the Contracting State party is subordinate 
to international la\-.,, 193 
III. it is submitted that the bulk of juristic writers on this 
subject support the contention that international law is hierar-
194 
chically superior over the Contracting State party's law. 
There then remains the question : What appropriate rules or principles of 
internationa l law should be applied? As stated ear li_er Article 42 (1) of 
the I.C.S.I.D. is silent on the definition of rules or principles of inter-
nationa l law that must be applied, but the Report of the Executive Directors 
of the World Bank195 again mentioned earlier is quite c lear in stating that 
the rules of international law that must be applied are those stipulated in 
Artic le 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, having in 
mind of course, that Article 38 of the above Statute was meant to apply to 
inter-State disputes. For arguments sake the following are suggested 
I. Inv estment Treaties : There is evidence which shows that 
a l arge number of bilateral agreements have been entered into, 
the aim of which is to establish a system for investments by 
nationals of the two States parties , however it can be argued 
that such practice has not taken the form of a custom as required 
by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice~
96 
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Apart from the I.C.S.l.D. there are no other multilateral treaties 
that establish a system for foreign investment. 
II: General Principles of law : The fact that international 
law has been developed or designed to govern relations bet\•1een 
States and other subjects of international law,it has been 
argued that public international is inadequate to deal with 
complex investment agreements concluded between States and 
private i nves to rs. 197 HO\.;ever,,. the subj ectt; of the treatment 
of foreign nationals and their propertie~
198 
and the funda-
mental principle of "pacta sunt servanda 11199 cannot be left 
in isolation. It is now the general consensus that States 
have the right to nationalize properti~s of foreign nationals 
IS 
provided that it is for public purpose,1-\vithout discrimination, 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation is paid.
200 
The 
usage of the principle of "pacta sunt servanda", although an 
established principle of law, is controvers ial in that, for 
example, it has been invoked to mean that a breach of State 
Contract per se is a breach of international law, but on 
those occassions the tribunal has rejected that argument for 
one reason or another. 201 It i s therefore submitted that 'the 
scope of these principles is controversial and their interpret-
ation and application raise great difficulties. The principles 
are also insuffici ent becau se they are narrowly and particularly 
concerned with the protection of the private investor , and do 
not establish a true long-term relations for the purpose of 
economic developmentt .
202 
Ill. State Practice : . It is submitted that 'repeated entry into 
similar contracts can create obligatory norms' .
203 
This can best 
be exemplified by the Sapphire Arbitration Case .
204 
Since the 
agreement between Sapphire and N.1. 0.C . contained no express 
choice of law the arbitrator had to look at the provisions of 
two other similar agreements which N.1.0.C. had entered into to 
decide what was the applicable l aw governing the 
Sapphire agreement . One of the agreement~ referred to contained 
an express choice of law. 
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In his conclusion the arbitrator said 
11 It is true that there is no such provision in the present Agreement, 
nor in the one made in 1958 with the Pan-American Petroleum Corpor-
ation. But the essential character of all these contracts is the 
same; they all have the same object and the same character, as is 
evidenced by the complete similarity of several of their clauses, 
particularly those dealing with performance and arbitration. By 
virtue of the principle of good faith, N.I.O.C. cannot claim that 
the absence of an express provision regarding the law applicable 
should be interpreted as a denial of a principle contained in 
previous agreements which had the same object. The requirements of 
a guarantee by the foreign company are the same; therefore accord-
ing to reason and good faith, the same solution should be adopted, 
as N.I.O.C. formally agreed to with more powerful partners. If 
then, in the present contract, ·N.I.0.C. had intended to cast aside 
a principle which is recognized in the previous agreements and to 
refuse Sapphire a guarantee which they had previously conceded as 
l egit imate , it must be presumed that the draftsma n of the Contract 
would have expressly shown his intent ion. It is quite clear from 
the above that parties intended to exclude the application of 
Iranian law. But they have not chosen another positive legal 
system and this omission is on all the evidence deliberate. All 
the connecting factors cited above point to the fact that the 
·parties therefore intended to submit the interpretation and perform-
ance of their contract to principles of law generally recognized by 
civilized nations, to which Article 37 of the Agreement refers, 
being the only clause which contains an express reference to an 
applicable law. The Arbitrator will therefore apply these principles, 
in taking account, VJhen necessary of the decisions taken by interna-
tional tribunals. 11205 
In this case it can be seen that the source used by the Arbitrator 
to draw the conclusion that the parties intended that the principles 
of law generally recognized by civilized nations should apply was the 
practice the National Iranian Oil Company had in entering into similar 
contractual agreements with other compa~ies. However it is hard to 
determine that such practice of a State can become a source of inter-
national law as stipulated under Article 38 (l) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. 
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PART IV CONCLUSION 
A. LAW AT PRESENT 
I. International law come s into play 1·1hen the La\'-1 of State 
Responsibility is invoked. 
States become internationally liable for breaches of State 
Contracts under the law of State Responsibility for the 
treatment of aliens. 
206 
II. International Commercial Law 
There is now a move towards adopting an international 
commercial law which has arisen because of the fact that 
commerc~al transactions in the international sphere between 
international persons, international financial institutions, 
for examp·1e, The World Bank and private corporations haw 
reached a stage where it is said that public inter.national 
should have some direct bearing on transactions by the 
above-mentioned entities. 
207 
International Commercial Law is often referred to as International 
Law of Contracts, 
208 however both phrases carry the same 
209 
meaning. Several juristic writers have suggested that public 
international law could be applied to transactions between 
States and private corporations and even several decisions of 
arbitral tribunals 
210have indicated that public international 
law may be applicable to State Contracts in certain circumstances. 
However, several objections have been raised to rebutt the 
above argument. Firstly, that public international law has 
not fully developed definite principles that may apply to 
international commercial transactions such as State Contracts 
of the type concerned in this research paper. Secondly, public 
international law in its traditional setting applies to 
relations between states and/or other international personalities. 
211 
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What then is the meaning of 11 lnternational Comme rcial Law
11
? 
It's a new branch of public international law v1hich has 
arisen as a result of the above objections so that inter-
national commercial transaction~such as State Contracts may 
be governed directly by this new branch of public international 
law. Thus, the so-called public international commercial 
law is based on general compa rative principles of commercial 
contracts. 212 
III. The Changing Structure of internat ional law 
As discussed above in Part 4 (A) (II) recent developments 
in international commercial transactions havcmade it 
inevitable th~somehow room should be made to allow the 
application of public international law to such commercial 
transactions, for example, State Contracts. 
213 
This 
situation is best summarised by Friedmann 
214 
where he 
states that: 
II 
But if we regard international law as a system 
that has, from its very beginning, responded 
to the social needs of international life, 
and that must continue to respond to the 
changing structure of international relations, 
its 1 imitation to the fonns of yesteryear is 
not only injurious but quite unnecessary. 
The '~eneral principles of law recognized by 
civilised nations 11 constitute an important 
source of law as recognised in the statute 
of the International Court of Justice, but 
not a separate system of law. They can and must 
nourish the still embryonic system of inter-
national law, as it expands and widens from 
the traditional and limited sphere of inter-
state relations to a fa~ fuller and more diversified 
system of public international legal relations
11
• 
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